Ridley, Inc. – RCL.TO

Ridley, Inc. is an animal nutrition company. Ridley processes and distributes cattle feed and nutritional additives in the US and Canada. The company also produces premium horse feed through its McCauley Bros. subsidiary. Though it is headquartered in Canada, the majority of revenues and and profits come from the company’s US operations. Ridley is 78%-owned by Canadian insurer Fairfax Holdings, sometimes considered one of the “Baby Berkshires.”

Ridley has gone through an extended period of poor results and restructuring, and those efforts are finally showing fruit. A number of unprofitable facilities have been closed, and margins are on the rise after bottoming in 2012. What’s more, the company’s crown jewel division has continued to grow and is achieving record revenues and profits. The company’s stock price has rallied, but not enough to fully price in these improvements.

First, a little background. The beef business has been tough for the last several years. Ongoing drought conditions have caused US beef production to decline to levels not seen for decades. As of January 2013 the total US cattle population was 89.3 million, according to the National Agricultural Statistics Service. This is the lowest since 1952. Conditions are similar in Canada. From 2003 to 2013, the Canadian cattle population fell 9%.

Falling cattle populations lead to a sharp decline in profitability for Ridley. From 2007 to 2012, gross margins declined from 16.36% to 11.60%. Revenues rose in absolute terms, but not enough to withstand the effects of the shrinking gross margins. Despite falling gross margins, Ridley was able to maintain its operating margin through aggressive cost cutting and shutting down unprofitable locations.

Here are five year figures for the company, unadjusted for one-time charges. Figures are in USD.


Subsequent to the end of fiscal 2012, Ridley has taken additional steps to improve profitability. Ridley’s Canadian feed operations struggled in 2012 and 2011, operating at just over or under breakeven each year. In December 2012, Ridley combined its Canadian feed operations with Masterfeeds, Inc. creating Masterfeeds LP. Ridley owns a minority stake in the surviving business. The business combination freed up significant capital and has already resulted in improved operations. For the first four months after the merger, Ridley’s share of operating income from Masterfeeds LP has been $0.5 million, compared to losses in 2012. If Masterfeeds LP’s results continue apace, Ridley will realize $1.5 million in income from associates this year, a nice uptick from 2012’s loss.

Ridley also acquired Stockade Brands, a maker of feeding blocks and nutritional minerals for livestock and equines. Stockade Brands is consolidated with Ridley Block Operations, Ridley’s block and nutritional mineral producer. In case you’re wondering, a cattle block looks a lot like this and contains a substance that cows will like to lick, ingesting beneficial nutrients in the process.


The result of these moves has been an uptick in profitability and income. Ridley has reported three quarters of operations since 2012. For the twelve trailing months ended March 31, 2013, Ridley’s operating performance has improved greatly over fiscal 2012.


These results include only four months of Masterfeeds LP and Stockade brands results. When fiscal 2013 results are released, I expect to see material increases in all categories over 2012 and over the twelve trailing months through Q3 2013.

While even better operating results are on the horizon, Ridley looks cheap on its current results. Ridley’s market cap in USD is $147.14 million. The company has small amounts of cash and debt on the books, making its enterprise value essentially the same as its market capitalization.


4.16x EBITDA and 5.11x EBIT are very reasonable prices to pay for a recovering business that has not yet reached its full earnings potential.

Alternatively, Ridley can be viewed as a sum of the parts story. Ridley’s operations are divided into four segments: US Feed Operations, Masterfeeds LP, Ridley Feed Ingredients and Ridley Block Operations. These four divisions vary widely in terms of growth and profitability and would be given divergent valuations if they were standalone companies.

Though it is not the largest division in terms of revenues, the star of the show is Ridley Block Operations. Since 2007, the division has growth its revenues at 7.6% annually and its operating income at 17.9% annually. Block Operations actually benefits from drought, because cows require more nutritional supplements in very dry weather.


In reality, Ridley Block Operations’ results have been even better. Until 2012, the company included its McCauley Bros. equine feed business with Ridley Block Operations; that business is now included in the Ridley Feed Ingredients segment.

A business with RBO’s growth and operating leverage is clearly worth a healthy multiple. Even if that multiple is only 8x trailing operating income, RBO is worth $145.68 million, or essentially Ridley’s entire current market cap.

But Ridley’s other businesses certainly have worth as well. Ridley Feed Ingredients averaged $3.35 million in operating income on steady revenues from 2010 to 2012. At a 6x multiple, it’s worth $20.10 million. The US Feed Operations segment has only two years of information available, but for 2012 and 2011 it averaged $3.90 million in operating income. Revenues at US Feed Operations have been volatile. At a 5x multiple, the division is worth $19.50 million. Masterfeeds LP has limited history, so a conservative multiple is warranted. At 4x its projected $1.50 million in operating income, it is worth $6.00 million.

Again, these valuations are very conservative. They don’t account for the cost cutting Ridley has undergone, nor do they anticipate a rebound in the cattle industry.

Summing up the values of Ridley’s segments yields a value estimate much higher than Ridley’s current market cap.


If and when the US and Canada beef industries do turn around, the values of these segments could rocket higher. The USDA projects herd numbers will recover by 2018, based on expected declines in corn prices and an easing of drought conditions.

Even if a recovery in the cattle industry is delayed, investors can still benefit from the improvement in Ridley’s operations. If these improvements can be maintained, the market will eventually re-rate the company to a more reasonable valuation, probably at least 1 or 2 turns of EBITDA and EBIT higher than now.

Investors may also benefit from Ridley’s habit of paying special dividends, $3.50 per share in the last two years alone. Remember that Ridley is controlled by Fairfax, which will want a financial return on its investment. Ridley has little debt and could easily pay another substantial dividend through a combination of operating cash flow and modest borrowings.

Risks for Ridley include a return to the trend of lower and lower gross margins, which could necessitate additional restructuring costs. A resurgence of “Mad Cow Disease” would also deal the company a blow. Tax policy is an unknown factor. Presently, the company owes taxes on transfers from its US subsidiary to the parent company.

No position.

Blog news! I want to work for you.

My name is Dave Waters, and I write OTCAdventures.com. Since January of 2012, I’ve had the pleasure of writing about many different microcap, unlisted, and/or illiquid companies and assessing the investment potential of each, as well as describing my investment philosophy.

I am in the process of establishing an RIA that will offer separate accounts. If you are interested in learning more, please contact me.

My email address is OTCAdventures@gmail.com.


Art’s Way Manufacturing – ARTW

Today’s topic is one of my favorite tiny manufacturers, Art’s Way Manufacturing Company. Art’s Way, founded in 1956, is based in Iowa and trades on the NASDAQ. Art’s Way had 2012 sales of $36.5 million and has a market cap of $28.4 million.

Despite its small size, Art’s Way is the nation’s largest manufacturer of sugar beet harvesting equipment. Sugar beets are the source of 20% of the world’s sugar production and are grown around the world, especially in cooler climates where sugar cane cannot survive. Art’s Way also makes a variety of other agricultural implements, like grain augers, hay balers and manure spreaders. Art’s Way avoids competing in the market for extremely sophisticated and costly tractors and combines, instead focusing on simpler farm implements.

Over the last decade, Art’s Way has added business lines including pressurized vessels and modular buildings commonly used for animal containment and agricultural research.Art’s Way’s agricultural products accounted for 67.8% of revenues in 2012. Modular buildings accounted for 26.5%, while pressurized vessels made up 5.7%.

While Art’s Way is now a profitable and growing company, it wasn’t always so. The company flirted with bankruptcy in 2002 after several years of sustained losses. An infusion of capital kept the company afloat, and J. Ward McConnell, Jr. took over as chair.

Mr. McConnell has orchestrated quite a turnaround. Under his leadership, Art’s Way has been a shrewd acquirer, adding many new product lines as well as the vessels and modular buildings segments. Since 2005, Art’s Way has made small tuck-in acquisitions and introduced new product lines at the rate of nearly one per year.

transactionsAll of these transactions were financed by internally-generated funds or through bank debt. Shareholders have seen diluted shares outstanding increase by only 4.5% since 2002.

The result of these small, easily-digested acquisitions has been steady expansion of revenues and profits.

growthAnnual revenue growth of 12.8% and earnings growth of 16.7% over a decade is extremely impressive. Art’s Way was affected by the financial crisis and saw its annual revenue decline 18% from 2008 to 2009, but the long-term trend shows sustained growth. An investor who purchased Art’s Way at a split-adjusted price of $1.45 on December 31, 2002, made an annualized return of 15.5% over the next decade.

Results through May 31, 2013 show a slight decrease in revenue and EBITDA compared to the half-year ended May 31, 2012, but net income and free cash flow reached new highs. Revenues in the agricultural products division rose 22.7%, but the modular buildings division saw its revenues decline 62.2% as some large contracts were completed. Since the quarter’s end, Art’s Way has announced additional contracts for the modular buildings division.

Art’s Way’s trailing valuation looks quite reasonable. At a share price of $7.00, the company’s trailing P/E is 9.9.  Art’s Way carries net debt of $6.02 million, for a trailing EV/EBITDA of 7.2. Trailing results do not include Agro Trend’s contribution, since it was purchased so recently. If agricultural sales stay strong and the modular building segment rebounds, Art’s Way’s valuation could be much lower a few quarters hence.

Truth be told, Art’s Ways short-term results concern me very little. That’s because I believe Art’s Way is one of those rare companies capable of earning a high return on capital, and capable of reinvesting the great majority of its earnings at high rates of return. The combination of the two results in swift growth in book value per share, which ultimately drives returns. Art’s Way’s average ROE for the past decade was 17.9%. The company pays out about 15% of its earnings in dividends, leaving plenty of capital to compound.

The chances of that compounding continuing are good. Art’s Way’s capital allocation policy has been excellent under Mr. McConnell. The company’s practice of identifying and acquiring the neglected divisions of other companies at modest prices is scalable and repeatable. For all its growth, Art’s Way still does less than $40 million per year in revenue. Another decade of similar growth would result in annual turnover of $122 million. That’s not hard to imagine in a world where Deere & Co. does $36 billion in annual revenue and Case New Holland does $20 billion.

Risks to Art’s Way’s continued success include a slump in crop prices, particularly in sugar beets. Changes to sugar subsidies in the US farm bill could result in fewer acres of sugar beets planted. And of course, extreme drought or flooding could disrupt Art’s Way’s customers. Despite these risks, Art’s Way looks attractively priced relative to current earnings and the long growth runway ahead of it.

I own shares in Art’s Way Manufacturing.


Wilh. Wilhelmsen Companies – Part 2

Time now to examine Norway’s other Wilh. Wilhelmsen company, Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding Group ASA. “WWHG” is the parent company of the company I profiled yesterday, Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA.

WWHG owns 72.73% of Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, as well as significant other assets. These assets include investments in logistics and maritime services, as well as holdings in a publicly-traded  Australian logistics provider.

If anything, WWHG is even more complex than its subsidiary, Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA. The parent company owns (in whole or via a controlling stake) many dozens of subsidiary companies, and has minority stakes in many more. The company provides a basic organization chart illustrating its major business lines. Tickers and ownership percentages are provided for subsidiaries and affiliates that are publicly-traded.



WWHG’s value should be at least equal to the value of its publicly-traded holdings, but the market thinks otherwise. As of yesterday, WWHG’s market capitalization is $1.29 billion USD, while the combined market value of its stake in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA and Qube Holdings Ltd is $1.41 billion. WWHG is currently priced at a discount of 9% to the value of its publicly-traded holdings alone, disregarding the value of its other operations entirely.

discount to holdings

Remember, though, Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA is itself considerably under-valued, based on the value of its own holding in Hyundai Glovis and its car carrier operations. In yesterday’s analysis, I conservatively estimated WWASA’s value at $2.556 billion. Using the adjusted value results in a 35% discount to the value of WWHG’s shareholdings.

discount to adjusted holdings

The company’s main division is the 72.73%-owned Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA business. In yeseterday’s post, I estimated the company’s worth at $2,556 million, of which $1,859 million is attributable to WWHG.

WWHG’s second-largest line of business is Wilhelmsen Maritime Services AS. WMS produced operating profits of $68 million in 2012, and averaged $66.87 million in operating profit over three years. The WMS division operates many JVs, leading to some minority investors having a claim on its profits. Even though WMS recorded nearly no minority interest in 2012, I am assuming a 20% average reduction to operating income for minority interest. Valuing the division at 8x that conservative figure results in a valuation of $428 million.

WMS valuation

WWHG’s remaining operations are lumped together as the “Holdings and Investments” segment. This segment operates in an eclectic mix of business lines, not all of them profitable. The segment is the “forward-looking” part of the company, charged with advancing the industry. Profits for the division are lumpy, and largely related to the Qube Holdings investment. Backing out gains and losses related to Qube leaves operating losses of $14 million in 2012 and an average loss of $20.37 million over three years. The 2010 loss of $35.1 million was affected by expenses due to the IPO of Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA and an office relocation.

Despite the ongoing losses at Holdings and Investments, I value the segment at book asset value, less the value of its stake in Qube. The Holdings and Investments segment’s operations benefit the remainder of the company through technological and managerial advancements, many of which will never be reflected in the division’s financial statements. In addition, the division purchased 35.4% of Norsea Group in 2012. This investment is performing well and delivering greater and greater profits to Holdings and Investments.

WHI valuation

My value estimates of WWHG’s shareholdings and operations sum to $2.64 billion.

WWHG Valuation

That’s the value of the firm. Determining the value of the firm’s equity requires adjusting for cash, other securities and debt.

WWHG carries $2,008 million in interest-bearing debt. However, $1,534 million is attributable to the WWASA subsidiary, leaving $472 million at the company’s other segments. WWHG has $576 million in cash. WWASA’s portion is $344 million, leaving $232 million at WWHG. Finally, WWHG holds $84 million in various Nordic stocks and bonds at the parent company level.

WWHG Valuation net of debt

Adjusting for WWHG’s net debt and securities yields an equity value of $2.42 billion, or $52.09 per share. This estimate of fair value is 88% above current prices.

WWHG appears to be even more under-valued than its subsidiary, WWASA. But why? Both companies appear to suffer from the classic holding company discount. The market abhors complexity, and firms that utilize extensive crossholdings and joint ventures are penalized by investors who can’t or won’t take the time to dig deep into the financial statements.

In addition to being a holding company, WWHG is a controlled company. Three Wilhelmsen siblings control 60% of voting power, giving them unassailable control. Some investors shy away from controlled companies, but I look at the situation differently. In my view, the Wilhelmsens could not be more highly incentivized to manage the company well. Their reputations and the fate of a 150 year family legacy depend on it, as does the lions share of their personal wealth.

The track record of both Wilhelmsen companies speaks in their favor. WWHG has returned over 15% annually for the last decade, while WWASA has more than doubled since its 2010 IPO. Both companies are well-positioned, reaping profits from the strong car carrier market and investing in logistics and maritime services that will help them weather the ups and downs of the deeply cyclical shipping market. Neither firm employs excessive leverage, and both firms pay regular dividends.

Investors in both companies will likely do extremely well as the world’s population and economy expand. The expansion of the global middle class will require more vehicles than ever before, and the Wilhelmsen companies will be there to ship them.

No positions, plan to buy shares in each company soon as I can transfer funds to a broker that allows trading on the Oslo Exchange.


Wilh. Wilhelmsen Companies – Part 1

The Wilh. Wilhelmsen companies are the world’s largest operators of car carrier ships. The companies also provide a host of logistics and marine industry services, independently and in conjunction with other major shipping companies. The Wilh. Wilhelmsen companies trace their history back to 1861, when Morten Wilhelm Wilhelmsen began with a single ship in Tønsberg, Norway. Today, the Wilhelm companies operate in 73 countries and employ nearly 28,000, including joint ventures.

In their present form, the Wilh. Wilhelmsen companies operate as two legally separate, yet related entities. Both the Wilh. Wilhemsen companies are complex operations, with dozens of joint ventures and minority partners. Both of the companies are also extremely undervalued, trading at large discounts to their earnings power and net asset values.

Shares of the Wilh. Wilhelmsen companies are traded on the Oslo exchange. The Wilhelmsen family continues to own majority stakes in each company.

Today I’ll address Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA and tomorrow I’ll tackle the parent company, Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA.

Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA

Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA operates in the shipping and logistics sectors, and also has a significant shareholding in Hyundai Glovis, a South Korean logistics company. The company is 72.73%-owned by its parent company.

Times have been good for the car carrier industry, even as the broad shipping market remains stuck in the doldrums. The global economic recovery has boosted vehicle shipments, with the US set to import the most vehicles since 2008. Shipbroker Clarkson Plc estimates global trade in vehicles will rise 7.2% in 2013. WWASA’s strategy is to own a base number of ships, then add capacity by chartering additional ships as needed.

The company has managed strong profits as the global auto industry rebounds.

WWASA Financials

Excluding a $134 million gain on the sale of an investment, WWASA earned $563 million in EBITDA and $275 million in net income in 2012. WWASA trades at a very modest multiple of these figures. From 2009 to 2012, consolidated revenues rose at a 5.1% rate, and adjusted EBITDA rose at 10.7%. WWASA’s reported valuation multiples are quite reasonable for a financially healthy, growing firm, but they hardly tell the full story.

WWASA owns a 12.5% stake in Hyundai Glovis Co. Ltd. Glovis is worth $6.4 billion, making WWASA’s stake worth $799 million, or 44.6% of WWASA’s market capitalization. Yet, Glovis contributed only $58 million in operating income in 2012. Excluding Hyundai Glovis from WWASA’s market capitalization and EBIT shows what an extremely low multiple the market is assigning to WWASA’s core operations.

WWASA Financials net of glovis


Excluding the value of WWASA’s stake in Hyundai Glovis and the associated share of profits, the market values WWASA’s other car carrier and logistics operations at only 4.6x 2012 net income and 5.8x EBIT.

Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA is also cheap on a price to book value basis. Book value at the end of 2012 was $1,553 million, yielding a price to book ratio of 1.15. However, the true value of WWASA’s joint ventures and affiliates does not appear on its balance sheet. At the end of 2012, the book value of WWASA’s investment in joint ventures and affiliates was $976 million. Yet, these assets contributed an average of $198.65 million in income over the last three years.

The implied valuation of the company’s JVs and affiliates is 4.91x 3-year average income, which is far too low. A more realistic, yet still conservative valuation of 8x average income would value the JVs and affiliates at $1,589 million, which would increase adjusted book value to $2,166 million and reduce WWASA’s adjusted price to book ratio to 0.83.

WWASA JVs Affiliaties

Assigning a reasonable valuation multiple to WWASA’s operations and giving the company full credit for the value of its investment in Glovis yields a fair value much higher than the current share price.

WWASA Fair Value

A reasonable valuation of 8x 2012 EBIT, plus the value of the company’s Glovis stake provides an enterprise value estimate of $3,639 million. Subtracting net debt of $1,073 million leaves equity value of $2,566 million or $11.66 per share, 43% above the current price.

Shipping companies all face certain risks, chiefly low charter rates caused by a supply and demand mismatch. Combined with high debt levels, many shipping companies swing widely between huge profits and equally enormous losses from year to year. WWASA is relatively conservatively financed and does not engage in speculative newbuild activity, making it a lower risk player in the attractive car carrier market.

No position.


Kyzen Corporation – KYZN

Last October I was working through a spreadsheet of dark unlisted companies and happened across Kyzen Corporation, which deregistered its shares in 2004. Kyzen got its start manufacturing alternative cleaning agents for industrial processes. Many solvents used in these processes once contained CFCs, which were discovered to be wreaking havoc on the ozone layer. When CFCs were banned by the Montreal Protocol, Kyzen stepped in with more environmentally friendly products. Kyzen also engineers cleaning processes and provides contract cleaning services. Two thirds of Kyzen’s sales are to customers outside the US.

Though I was able to learn about Kyzen’s products and history, I could not locate any recent financial statements. I spent $12 to buy ten shares, hoping I would eventually receive an annual report.

That report arrived last week in the form of a sparse-looking black and white printed booklet. I paged through it, taking note of Kyzen’s operating results and financial position. What I found was encouraging, but I had a problem at hand.

When I look at a company’s results, I rarely focus solely on the most recent period. I like to compare recent results to the past five years or so. Doing so tells me a lot. First, I can get an idea of normalized profitability. If this year’s margins were unusually high or low, that may suggest that future periods will see a reversion to the mean. It could also mean the company has undertaken a strategy shift that will permanently change margins, or that general industry conditions have changed. Regardless, it is easier to assess the meaning of these data points by comparing them with previous periods. Once I have an idea of normalized earnings power, I can see if the current market value is justified.

Examining results over multiple periods also helps me assess management skill. If management continually reinvests earnings back into operations, I had better see growth! There’s not much worse than a company that consistently reports profits only to squander them due to bad capital allocation. In the long run, management skill shows up as growth in book value per share, adjusted for dividends.

Finally, I examine the company’s balance sheet for trends in leverage and liquidity. I care very little about the absolute amount of debt on a company’s balance sheet. Rather, I care about the debt relative to debt capacity, and the trend of that capacity. If a company is suffering from stagnant or declining revenues and margins, if had better not be taking on more debt and should probably be reducing the existing balance.

With Kyzen, much of the information I desired was missing. The 2012 annual report I received had figures for 2012 and 2011, but everything from 2004 to 2010 was a mystery. Luckily, Kyzen’s business is little-changed from a decade ago. The company is still manufacturing the same products and providing the same services, so looking at such old data can still be useful.

Normalized Profits

For 2012, Kyzen earned $1.07 million on revenue of $19.83 million. EBITDA was $2.14 million and operating income was $1.71 million. Here are the company’s results for 2012 and 2011, compared with figures from the company’s last five publicly filed 10-ks.


What a difference! 2012’s revenues are 3.4 times higher than the 1999-2003 average. Kyzen’s operating margins have reached the high single digits, no longer languishing below zero.

But is it sustainable? Kyzen’s 2012 profits were four times higher than 2011. Which is the anomaly?

First, gross margins. From 1999-2003, Kyzen’s average gross margin was 54.26%. 2012’s gross margin of 52.73% is much more in line with the average than 2011’s 44.89%. At the current revenue level, normalized gross profits of $10.45 million or a little higher seem sustainable.

Operating expenses ate up 44.12% of revenues in 2011 and 42.19% in 2011. By comparison, operating expenses averaged 55.85% of revenues from 1999-2003. Before concluding that operating expenses are due for a dramatic increase, remember that Kyzen’s revenues are more than triple what they were a decade ago. Positive operating leverage tends to increase operatings margins as revenues increase, because many operating expenses do not scale linearly with sales growth. In absolute terms, 2012 operating expenses are 2.7 times what they were in 2003. I view the 42-44% operating costs as normal and sustainable.

Since Kyzen’s margins seem sustainable, so do its profits. Barring a decrease in demand for Kyzen’s cleaning products, the company should be able to produce a repeat peformance in 2013.


Kyzen Corporation pays no dividends, retaining all profits for growth. Because they receive no income from their investment, shareholders should look to management to growth book value per share at an acceptable rate. Kyzen’s management has lived up to that expectation.

When Kyzen went dark in 2004, it had a book value per share of $0.40 with 4.69 million shares outstanding. Nine years later, book value has risen to $1.73 per share and shares outstanding have been reduced to 4.08 million. That’s an annualized increase in book value per share of 17.5%, excellent by any standards. From 2011 to 2012, book value per share increased by 14.88% as shares oustanding declined by 2%.

Management has shown great skill in capital allocation. For as long as management can continue to find worthwhile investments, they are justified in retaining and reinvesting profits.

Balance Sheet

Kyzen maintains a strong balance sheet with $0.65 million in net cash. The company is slightly more levered than it was in 2003, but remains conservatively financed.

balance sheet

As Kyzen’s revenue and profitability has grown, so has its debt capacity. If management saw fit, Kyzen’s balance sheet could bear additional debt for continued share repurchases or capital projects.


Shares are bid at $1.21 and offered at $1.38. Kyzen is cheap at either price.


Kyzen is quoted at a P/E of 4.6 to 5.3, an EV/EBITDA of 2.0 to 2.3 and an EV/EBIT of 2.5 to 2.9. Kyzen is in great shape, with strong profits, capable management and a sound balance sheet. A P/E of 10 would yield a share price of $2.62. At an EV/EBITDA of 5, the company would be worth $2.78 per share.

If the next nine years are anything like the last, Kyzen shareholders will do exceptionally well. But don’t expect to hear about Kyzen’s results in the news! Kyzen sends out only one report per year, and only to shareholders. Would-be investors must be content to be left in the dark. Investors should also remember that Kyzen is extremely tiny, and illiquid.

I own shares in Kyzen Corporation.