Post edited after a helpful reader pointed out some calculation errors. The conclusions reached have not changed. That’s what I get for writing after midnight.
I’ve haven’t written on Awilco Drilling for a while, but the company’s never been far from my mind. How could it be, when the past five months have been one long, painful slide from over $26 to $11 per US ADR? The reason for the decline is obvious: an unforeseen and extraordinary decline in oil prices and the associated carnage in nearly all oil-related companies. In hindsight, there were obvious signs of coming weakness that I ignored. Chief among them was the large share sale by the company’s controlling shareholders. At the time I dismissed it as merely portfolio reshuffling and profit-taking. The sting of loss has a way of clarifying reality, and it now seems obvious that the Wilhelmsens knew exactly what was ahead for the sector and reduced their exposure accordingly.
The past is the past and it can’t be changed, but now the question in every suffering investor’s mind is: what does the future hold for Awilco shares?
First, let’s take a look at just how severe Awilco’s decline has been relative to its peers. The graphic below shows the change in Awilco’s enterprise value and market capitalization since its shares peaked on July 24. Figures are presented in local currency millions. Net debt is reduced for the balance sheet value of newbuild assets. Note this analysis does not attempt to incorporate changes in the market values of rig operator debt, which has undoubtedly decreased.
Of the various offshore drilling companies on the list, Awilco’s enterprise value has declined the most since late July. On one hand, Awilco had been one of the best performers in the segment in the months leading up to the collapse. On the other, Awilco’s low leverage and robust backlog make the magnitude of the decline difficult to understand. Awilco doesn’t compete in the ultra-deep-water space, where over-supply and reduced investment will take the greatest toll. Nor should investors worry about liquidity because Awilco has no funding commitments for newbuilds and its debt isn’t due until 2019.
My theory is that Awilco’s share have been punished by an exodus of yield-chasing investors concerned with the sustainability of Awilco’s dividends. Their fears are justified, to an extent. The near-certain decrease in dayrates will crimp Awilco’s dividends once the current contracts are completed. But Awilco’s current valuation seems to anticipate a near-complete elimination of earnings/dividends once WilPhoenix’s contract with Apache is up in mid-2017.
The chart below projects Awilco’s contractually guaranteed earnings for the next eleven quarters, from now until the company’s final rig contract expires. These projections include a number of assumptions, laid out below.
1. WilHunter ceases operations in December 2015 and is not active for the duration of the projection.
2. WilPhoenix is inactive from mid-April 2016 to mid-June 2016 for yard time.
3. Yard survey expenses for each rig are $15 million.
4. Daily rig operating expenses are $92,000.
5. Quarterly interest expense begins at $2.19 per quarter and is adjusted for bi-annual $5 million principal amortization.
6. Depreciation is $4.5 million per quarter, increasing by $0.625 million once each blow-out preventer is installed.
7. The tax rate is 20%.
That’s plenty of assumptions. Here’s my projection:
Between now and mid-2017, Awilco should earn about $205 million. Peak earnings will be Q1-Q3 2015, when both rigs are in full operation. The worst will be Q2 2016, when WilPhoenix is idled for most of the quarter. Of course, reality will differ from this projection. But the most important takeaway is just how much of Awilco’s market capitalization is represented by earnings that will arrive within three years. Over 60%! Fully 46% of Awilco’s current $333.6 million market cap will be earned between now and the end of 2015.
The market seems to be awarding only nominal value to Awilco’s potential earnings once its current contracts expire. To put this in perspective, the remaining metal fatigue lifespan of each rig (per the company) is around 15 years. Now, I don’t expect each rig to be employed for the full 15 years if dayrates experience a significant decline. But I do expect each rig to be employed in some fashion for at least a decade, and to have some residual value at the end of that term, if only for scrap.
Assume for a moment that each rig is employed for another ten years. Backing out the current contracts leaves 16.5 rig-years remaining until each rig is sold or scrapped. Subtracting the contractually guaranteed earnings of $204.8 million from Awilco’s current market cap leaves only $128.8 million, or just an undiscounted $7.8 million per year, per rig. Barring an outright collapse of the oil economy, I have difficulty seeing any sort of scenario in which Awilco’s earnings power declines 90% in the coming years. (Doesn’t mean there’s no way it could happen, only that I think it’s extremely unlikely.)
To reinforce the point, let’s take a look at a scenario in which dayrates for Awilco’s rigs decline by nearly 50% to $200,000 per day. The graphic below lays out yearly earnings and cash flows for this scenario. It assumes daily rig operating expenses decline 20% once the current contracts expire, which I think is reasonable for a scenario in which rig-workers and suppliers suddenly find their services much less in demand. This projection, like the one before it, includes a lot of highly uncertain projections, like another two-month yard stay for each rig in 2020/2021, selling off the rigs for half of book value in 2024, and the release of all net non-cash working capital in the same year. It includes $25 million special capital expenditures for each rig for upgraded blow-out preventers, which are then depreciated over a ten-year schedule.
Using these assumptions, the present value of Awilco’s future cash flows is $356.2 million, or $11.86 per share. At the current price of $11.11 per US ADR, it seems the market is expecting a scenario worse than this: one in which dayrates decline even more, or Awilco’s rigs have shorter lifespans, or where one or both rigs is off-lease for substantial amounts of time.
Is that possible? Definitely. But it’s also possible that dayrates don’t decline by half, and in that case, Awilco is worth a lot, lot more than its current price. (At dayrates of $250,000 and daily rig operating expenses of $78,200, my estimate of present value rises to $15.87 per US ADR. The value only goes up from there if the rigs operate for longer than 10 years.)
If anything short of a complete collapse in offshore drilling dayrates is ahead of us, Awilco Drilling is likely a good buy at these levels. If a complete collapse arrives, Awilco will still reap about 61% of its market cap in its earnings over the next 11 quarters, which should provide some downside protection.
The next big test for Awilco will be if it can re-lease its WilHunter rig to Apache for 2016, or failing that, lease the rig to another operator for a reasonable time period at a dayrate remotely similar to what it earns now. If they are successful, I expect the stock to experience quite the relief rally. If not, the stock could find itself languishing at these levels for a while. Apache and Awilco must agree on terms for 2016 by late February, or Apache’s option will expire.
Given Awilco’s strong management team and clean balance sheet, I expect them to find a solution for WilHunter. Awilco’s value has been reduced by the rapidly deteriorating oil market, but I view the stock’s decline as too far, too fast. I made a mistake by not selling Awilco high. I don’t intend to compound my mistake by selling low.
Edit: In writing this piece, I wasted far too many words trying to say something simple. Suffice to say, Awilco’s current enterprise value is equal to contractual earnings from now until mid-2017, less yard expenses, plus net receivables and inventory, plus 54% of rig book value (including the new blow-out preventers.) If Awilco’s rigs are worth more than 54% of book value, it’s very likely that Awilco is under-valued. My opinion is pretty clear.
Alluvial Capital Managment, LLC holds shares of Awilco Drilling Plc for client accounts.
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